Alevist Movements at Home and Abroad: Mobilization Spaces and Disjunction by Massicard, Elise
Alevist Movements at Home and Abroad: Mobilization
Spaces and Disjunction
Elise Massicard
To cite this version:
Elise Massicard. Alevist Movements at Home and Abroad: Mobilization Spaces and Disjunc-
tion. new perspectives on Turkey, 2003, pp.163-187. <halshs-00655802>
HAL Id: halshs-00655802
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00655802
Submitted on 2 Jan 2012
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
Alevist movements at home and abroad:  
Mobilization spaces and disjunction 
 
Elise Massicard
*
 
 
Introduction 
The Alevist
†
 movement developed almost simultaneously in Turkey and among 
Turkish migrants, but it is structured and acts quite differently in these distinct, albeit related, 
political spaces. This comparative empirical study tries to explain the differences in the 
discourses and the success of Alevist movements in Turkey and Germany by relating them to 
the broader institutional and discursive contexts within which they are embedded. Alevist 
movements are incorporated differently in state policies directed to claim-makers and 
consequently possess different discursive and institutional resources. Spatially bounded 
institutional contexts and political agendas frame the discourse and strategies of Alevist 
claim-making, and result in divergent developments. It is thus necessary to disentangle the 
multiple levels of claim- and policy-making involved (local, national and supranational), and 
to analyze their relationships and possible articulations. 'Transnational' mobilization has often 
been understood as a mere continuation of mobilization at home or, oppositely, as its driving 
force. This paper questions the continuity between mobilizations at home and abroad, and 
argues that mobilization in migration entails specific dynamics, which may not be re-imported 
home.  
 
1. Mobilizations, environments and frames 
 
Alevist identity politics 
The Alevist movement can be considered as an affirmative 'politics of recognition', 
voicing demands in order to be recognized as a specific group and to obtain equal 
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1 I have chosen to distinguish Aleviness, which covers the social fact, from Alevism, which designs the 
movement in the name of Aleviness. 
participation in all spheres of life without facing discrimination (especially with regard to the 
Sunnis). In the course of this movement's development, different groups – to some extent 
identifiable with organizations - have emerged with diverse, or even opposite representations 
of Aleviness. Some claim Aleviness is a purely religious matter – the 'real religion' of Turks 
or even Kurds. For others, it is a political philosophy of liberation, resistance and democracy. 
For yet another group, Aleviness is mainly a culture, a way of life characterized by critical-
mindedness. Each group bases its representation on a reconstruction of Alevi history. Of 
course, depending on the political agenda, these stories vary: for example, those considering 
Aleviness as a revolutionary movement emphasize social uprisings – stylized as 'Alevi 
rebellions' - against the Selcuk and Ottoman dynasties. It is not our aim to describe here this 
diversity of positions, which has been discussed solidly in various works (Väth 1993, p. 216-
217 ; Vorhoff 1995). Suffice it to say that the lack of consensus on the nature, scope and 
contents of Aleviness, and even the level on which such an identity should be defined 
(religious, social, political, or cultural?) is a striking feature of contemporary Alevism. The 
numerous debates, accusations and criticisms on this topic, which constitute the main activity 
of Alevists, show that there is a constant struggle over its meaning.  
For those Alevis who speak about Aleviness, the aim is to show that they are the right 
kind of Alevis, while 'the others' are wrong Alevis. These different groups try to establish a 
monopoly over the right definition and over the right to represent Aleviness, giving the 
Alevist movement its highly competitive character. It is not just about politics of recognition; 
it is also, and maybe above all, about politics of recognition as a particular kind of Aleviness. 
Even after fifteen years of mobilization, this debate over the definition of Alevi identity and 
its boundaries is not settled. Depending on the political situation and events, various 
interpretations become more or less influential. For example, after the Sivas slaughter in 
1993, the religious representations of Aleviness were undermined, whereas more political and 
oppositional representations gained momentum. This changed after the Gazi riots in 1995, 
when opposition became less legitimate. But, until now, no group has managed to gain control 
over the definition of Aleviness. 
Social movement scholars conceptualize this signifying work or meaning construction 
by employing the term 'framing'. The concept of frame, when used in the study of social 
movements, is derived from the work of Goffman, for whom frames denote 'schemata of 
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interpretation' that enable individuals 'to locate, perceive, identify, and label' occurrences and 
events (1974, p. 21). At a social movement level, what mobilization theories call 'collective 
action frames' also perform this interpretive function by simplifying and condensing reality-- 
but in ways that are action-oriented. Collective-action frames define some problematical 
situation as being in need of change, identify who or what is to blame, and suggest alternative 
sets of arrangements. For instance, for secular-minded Alevists, Alevis' problems stem from 
Islamists having taken power, destroyed Turkey's secular heritage and introduced 
discrimination against Alevis; thus, secularism and the impartiality of the State should be 
restored. But for some more religious-minded Alevists, the problem is elsewhere: the secular 
State has an oppressive dimension regarding religion, and this is what should be changed in a 
liberal manner, so that Alevis, as well as other Muslims, can practice their religion freely. 
Thus, Alevist groups differ first of all in terms of issues they address and the corresponding 
direction of attribution. Depending on their interpretation of Aleviness, Alevists do not adopt 
the same discourse, and nor do they problematize the same institutions. For example, those 
who claim Aleviness is a religion and should be recognized as such, like the CEM foundation, 
demand the inclusion of Aleviness in those state institutions dealing with religion, while for 
others, like the Pir Sultan Abdal association, these institutions should simply be abolished. 
Therefore, collective action frames are sets of beliefs and meanings that inspire and legitimate 
the activities and claims of social movement organizations.  
Since they are the outcome of negotiating meanings, collective action frames are not 
static, reified entities, but are continuously being constituted, contested, reproduced, 
transformed, and replaced in the course of social movement activity
ii
. Thus, framing denotes a 
processual and interactive phenomenon (Benford and Snow, 2000, p. 614). Consequently, 
these groups are not static communities with clearly defined boundaries, but rather dynamic 
political locations where certain views and sometimes organizations ally (Erman and Göker, 
2000, p. 105). Whereas this debate is often understood as concerning Alevis alone, it has a 
broader scope. Not only activists and Alevi masses, but also the media, different political 
groups, and institutions take an active part in these 'framing contests' (Ryan 1991), with an 
attempt to 'rebut, undermine, or neutralize a group's myths, versions of reality, or interpretive 
framework' (Benford 1987, p. 75). The numerous articles printed in dailies and national TV 
programs on this topic attest to the public character of this debate, at least in Turkey.  
Among external actors involved in what has been referred to as 'the politics of 
signification' (Hall 1982), one should mention political actors like Turkish and Kurdish 
nationalists, Islamists, and secularists, who produce and spread influential views on 
Aleviness, and sometimes – most of the time implicitly - ally with some Alevists against 
others. Another major role is played by institutions, which sometimes bring about specific 
views on Aleviness, but above all also provide opportunities. Institutions manage important 
political and economic resources, distribute (or withhold) subsidies to organizations to 
encourage them, award (or deny) state aid to groups so as to organize activities. In the end, 
institutions define legitimate categories to be claimed, and criteria to be fulfilled. Thus, there 
are constant interactions between institutions and claim-makers. The state is an active partner 
in granting allocations and recognition, but also – even if indirectly – in claim-making and 
therefore in framing processes.  
On the whole, claim-makers do not bring about claims isolated from the surrounding 
institutional framework and political actors. Social movement framing processes and activities 
do not occur in a political or institutional vacuum, but within an institutionally structured 
space. Claims and debates over identity and recognition are very much shaped by elements 
from the socio-political context in which they are embedded, including the framings of 
institutions and other actors. In order to study a movement's activity, it is therefore crucial to 
take into account interactions between organizations and their environment.  
 
Alevist movements and their environments 
Drawing on the social movements literature, we can refer to these institutional 
frameworks as 'political opportunity structures', which 'consist of specific configurations of 
resources, institutional arrangements and historical precedents of social mobilization' 
(Kitschelt 1986, p. 58) and thus shape the levels and patterns of mobilization by providing 
certain resources, constraints and models for organizing. Since this concept may be 
considered as imprecise, one may distinguish the level of political superstructure which 
defines a stable, binding frame for all political actors (like the nature of the regime, the 
unitary or centralist nature of the State, the existence of statuses to be claimed, etc.) from the 
more easily changing, contextual level of power balances (Gamson and Meyer 1996). 
Political opportunity structures are generally considered as being national but, as we will see, 
can also be regional or local. Moreover, they are not identical for all movements in one 
political space. Concerning one given movement, the political opportunity structure defines 
the availability and relative attractiveness of different options for collective action that 
challenger groups face and perceive. It denotes variables like the status of the group in its 
environment, and perceived political constraints affecting claim-makers and institutions. What 
is interesting to us here is how political opportunity structures and their perception affect 
Alevists' activities and framing processes.  
Movements, like Alevism, being active in different political spaces are confronted 
with different political opportunity structures. The crucial role played by the institutional and 
political framework in the country of settlement on the migrants' patterns of organization and 
on their claim-making process has been analyzed (Koopmans and Statham 2000). In this 
respect, the most common approach is to compare one migrant group in several receiving 
countries, probably because it points to the ever popular issues of policies of reception and 
integration. But political opportunity structures of the receiving countries are rarely compared 
to those of the country of origin, probably because to compare political opportunities and their 
perception as native citizens and as migrants may not allow any systematic comparison. 
However, since our aim here is not comparison as such, but to describe the disjunction 
between movements in different political spaces, we will compare political opportunity 
structures, as they are faced and perceived by the Alevist movement, at home and in 
Germany. Aleviness being a specifically contested and fluid topic, with no prevailing 
organization or interpretation, its framings may vary greatly depending on the institutional 
and political framework in which it is embedded. In fact, the groups and interpretations 
mentioned above are present in both countries, but in different proportions. 
 
Alevism in Turkey: an impossible recognition? 
The Turkish State is unitary: it denies any group specific features and criminalizes any 
particularism as 'separatism', even more so since the beginning of the Kurdish nationalist 
movement. There is no recognized status as minority
‡
. Thus, the Turkish context provides 
very narrow opportunity for any kind of recognition of particularism.  
In the religious field, Aleviness was stigmatized under the Ottomans and later 
officially denied in the Turkish Republic, although it was officially secular. Speaking about a 
separation of State and religion in contemporary Turkey would be misleading. Rather, one 
should speak about a domestication of religion by the State, which mainly manifests itself 
through the Directory of Religious Affairs (DİB). This institution has a monopoly over 
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official religion, especially over the nomination and management of its clergymen. Far from 
being religiously neutral, the Turkish State has institutionalized the Sunni interpretation of 
Islam as the official denomination by default (Bozarslan 1994). Consequently, the DİB 
considers Alevis as being Muslims who have somehow been pushed out of the 'true path'. No 
different treatment is reserved or even allowed to them: Alevi children must attend 
compulsory religion courses at school, where exclusively Sunni interpretations are taught. 
Despite their claims and the debates they instigated, the Alevists have obtained neither any 
recognition of their religious status nor the introduction of Aleviness into the compulsory 
religious education. They have also failed to obtain the abolition of either the DİB or the 
compulsory religion classes – all of these being among their most important claims. 
Consequently, while mosques and churches, recognized as worship places, are exempted from 
water and electricity charges, cemevi, the so-called Alevi worship places, are not.  
In the cultural field, the situation is somewhat different. Some cultural elements which 
can be attributed to Alevis, like songs or poems, were integrated into the official culture and 
encouraged. However, they have often been cleaned of any Alevi component and thus 
'neutralized' (Coşkun 1995, p. 208, 214). In this way, institutions like the Ministry of Culture 
have attempted to 'rehabilitate' Aleviness within the framework of Turkish national culture, 
whilst denying it any specific character outside this framework. 
Regarding political balances, it is important to make clear that Alevist demands were 
not supported nor relayed by any political party, not even by those that Alevis most supported 
(Schüler 1998, p. 242-245 for social-democratic parties ; Massicard 2002, p. 468-472 for 
other parties). Up to now, claims for recognition or specific treatment remain illegitimate, and 
no party would take the risk of being identified as an 'Alevi party', and thereby risk losing 
votes of non-Alevis. 
On the whole, the Alevist movement has failed to obtain any kind of recognition or of 
specific treatment by the Turkish State. Some minor subsidies have been distributed to mostly 
State-friendly Alevist organizations for cultural or social activities - especially at a local level, 
or in times of general mobilization against Islamists. State institutions do not any longer deny 
the existence of Aleviness; they mostly defend an Aleviness molded in Turkish nationalism, 
but not Alevism. Therefore, they don't really favor one particular organization, and do not 
encourage any of the competitive tendencies within the Alevist movement. By hindering the 
formation of a unique official Alevi interlocutor, they have indirectly contributed to the split 
of the movement. One may assume that they even took advantage of its divided character and 
consequent weakness to ignore its claims.  
 
Alevism in Germany: from Culture to Religion? 
In Germany, political opportunities for Alevis are, of course, different. There, the 
Alevi issue is derivative from the 'migration' issue. As migrants, they have fewer rights and 
political opportunities than native citizens (for the political opportunities of migrants in 
Germany, see Amiraux 2001). Options for claim-making and recognition nonetheless differ, 
and have widened in recent years. 
In the religious field, Germany is not a secular State: State and religion are not 
separated, but cooperate. This is mostly the case for educational matters. In principle, religion 
is taught in public schools. Religious institutions determine the content of religion courses, 
while the State is responsible for the organizing and financing of these courses, assuring their 
conformity with constitutional principles. On this basis, the claim from religions for 
institutionalization refers to specific legal status. The highest legal status for religious groups 
is public law corporation (Körperschaft des öffentlichen Rechts). The required conditions to 
be granted this status are quite severe: stability, sustainability, a clear organizational structure, 
and a certain number of members. Otherwise, the status of religious community
§
 is more 
advantageous than being a mere association: a religious community cannot be disbanded 
easily, and may provide religious teaching in public schools. Thus, the main goal for the 
mobilization of religious groups - be they migrants, like Muslims, or not, like Jehovah’s 
witnesses - is to obtain a legal status.  
However, this opportunity was passed up by Alevists until recently, since it was not 
perceived as such. As migrants, Alevis did not initially claim any distinctiveness, since they 
thought they were there temporarily. This changed in the course of the 1970s. In the 1980s 
and 1990s, as mobilization was beginning and as multiculturalism gained momentum, the 
issue of immigration to Germany was treated mainly in terms of cultural difference. 
Multicultural policies provided many institutional opportunities, resources and space for the 
institutionalization of 'cultural' organizations (Vertovec 1996). Thus, they shaped the 
institutional and discursive framing of migrants' claim-making. After Turks and Kurds, the 
heightened awareness of questions concerning cultural identity was also applied to Alevis. 
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Aware of the political support for multiculturalism, Alevists negotiated with the German 
society for subsidies or integration, and began to stress their distinctiveness and to frame it 
mainly in terms of a culture in need of protection (Kaya 1998).  
We can assume that the existence and perception of this cultural opportunity helped to 
structure the Alevist movement and contributed to the emergence of a central organization, 
the Federation of Alevi Communities of Germany (AABF). The AABF, although claiming 
until recently a mainly cultural version of Aleviness, manages to incorporate different views. 
The Alevist movement is less divided in Germany than it is in Turkey because the German 
environment is less polarizing for Alevists than the Turkish one. Among the major Turkish 
migrants' organizations in Germany, the AABF is the only one that is not a direct progeny of 
any 'mother' organization in Turkey.  
 
2. The opening of a religious opportunity: the Berlin case 
The issue of plurality in German public space is posed most acutely by the large 
number of Turkish migrants. Still, the religious identity of the mainly Muslim immigrants had 
nearly no impact on integration policy until the mid-1990s when, in accordance with the 
'global' agenda, attention was drawn to 'fundamentalist' sympathies among the Muslim youth, 
and the religious dimension of immigration came to the fore (Heitmeyer 1997). Until then, 
recognition had not been obtained by any recent migrant religion, a failure related to the 
difficult acceptance by the German society of non-Christian migrants. Therefore, Alevis did 
not perceive the potential of obtaining religious status as an opportunity
**
.  
 
The legal incorporation of religious difference in Berlin 
In February 2000, a high administrative court recognized an Islamic organization, the 
Islamic Federation of Berlin (IFB) as being a religious community, granting it the right to 
provide religious education in public schools. This recognition was obtained at the specific 
institutional level of the Länder. In Germany, federate States are responsible for worship and 
educational matters. For this reason, the recognition of religious groups, and the organization 
of their ability to teach in public schools, is a Land matter. Groups being granted these 
statuses differ from one state to the other, even if some of them are recognized everywhere. 
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At the same time, each State offers different legal opportunities to religious education (Özdil 
1999).  
A few weeks after this recognition, the Anatolian Alevis' Cultural Center (AAKM), 
Berlin's most important Alevist organization (affiliated to the AABF), suddenly interested in 
this possibility, asked for the same status as the IFB. The recognition of the IFB does not 
imply its monopoly over the representation of Islam. This can best be explained by the 
German tradition of bi-denominationalism: in principle, the German State has to be 
religiously neutral towards all different religions and denominations, and must guarantee the 
equality of all religious persuasions
††
. This principle originates from the parity recognized 
between the two Christian communities. Unlike the Turkish State, German institutions do not 
have difficulty understanding the duality between Sunnis and Alevis. Alevists sometimes take 
advantage of this by presenting themselves as 'the Protestants of Islam'
‡‡
. This explains why 
the recognition of one Muslim religious community does not imply its exclusive 
representativeness of Islam, but on the contrary opens the way to demands by other Muslim 
groups. Noticing the opening of religious opportunity, activists began to frame Aleviness as a 
religion in need of protection and equal rights with Sunni Islam, the framing of equality of 
rights being very legitimate in Germany. And as early as 2000, the AAKM was given the 
status of a religious community. 
 
The local political balance 
It should be noted here that the AAKM obtained the status of religious community 
much more quickly and easily than the IFB did. While the IFB was involved in a twenty-year 
legal battle (the first request from the IFB was sent in 1980), the AAKM obtained the status 
only a few months after having applied. This appears a bit strange, first of all because of the 
numerical size of the two 'communities': Alevis in Berlin are far fewer than Sunni Muslims, 
and members of the AAKM much less numerous than members of the IFB. Moreover, the 
IFB was much more active on the issue and called for a far more massive mobilization than 
the AAKM did. How can the differential treatment of the IFB's and AAKM's requests by the 
Berlin local authorities be explained?  
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The first hypothesis is that the AAKM fulfils the requested legal conditions to obtain 
the status of religious community better. But this hypothesis can hardly be defended. In fact, 
the reasons put forward during twenty years to refuse the status to the IFB 
(Oberverwaltungsgericht Berlin 1998) could have easily been put forward to reject the 
AAKM. The first reason put forward was the lack of a unique interlocutor representing all 
Muslims and of a single indisputable and shared Weltanschauung (world view). But among 
Berlin Alevis also, different orientations and theological views coexist. The AAKM is the 
dominant Alevi organization, but it was and is still contested by other organizations, with 
which it did not reach an agreement to make a joint request for recognition. Even among the 
AAKM's members, the existence of a shared Weltanschauung is highly questionable. The 
second reason that had been advanced was that the internal organization of Muslim worship is 
not based on any church-like hierarchy. But among Alevis, there is no church-like hierarchy, 
and the role of the dede, the traditional religious authorities, is unclear and contested, because 
of both the lack of a general hierarchy among them, and due to the breakdown of traditional 
religious institutions and the transmission of dede status (Sökefeld 2002).  
Legally speaking, there was no reason to recognize the AAKM a religious community 
while the IFB had been rejected, or to do it more quickly. The only possible legal reason is the 
fact that the decision to recognize the IFB, and thus to give Muslim children the same right to 
receive religious education as Christian children, constituted a precedent to the recognition of 
the AAKM. But a mere precedent does not constitute grounds for decision. The last judicial 
criterion is 'conformity of the religious community to the basic law' (i.e. the constitution), 
which was always suspected not to be the case for 'mainstream Muslims'. However, this is 
more a political argument than a purely judicial one.  
It seems in fact that the explanation of this differential treatment may well be a 
political one. Islam in Germany, like in most West European countries, enjoys a very negative 
image. It is often assimilated with 'reluctance to assimilate', with backwardness, with 'issues' 
like 'the veil', or directly with 'fundamentalism'. The recognition of the IFB, criticized for its 
supposed relations with Islamist parties in Turkey, was very controversial. In this perspective, 
the recognition of an Alevi association provided a counterweight to a religion, and to an 
organization, that were negatively perceived. Indeed, the manner in which the AAKB presents 
itself to the German public is highly significant: it stresses the Alevis' difference from the 
majority of migrants from Turkey – which Alevists systematically do - and implicitly puts a 
distance between itself and a stigmatized Islam. Many Alevis actually share these negative 
views on Sunni Islam and even contribute to spread the stereotype that it is a 'fundamentalist 
danger'. They present themselves, in contrast, as bearers of a more democratic, more tolerant, 
and more 'modern' Islam
§§
. For example, they often insist on the equality of sexes which they 
claim to practice, implicitly or explicitly suggesting that 'bad' Sunni Muslims practice sexual 
discrimination and are thus neither integrated nor modern
***
. In the same way, Alevists in 
Germany insist on the conformity of their cult to the German Basic Law, which is always a 
point of suspicion concerning 'mainstream' Muslims.  
This representation has been widely adopted by the German politicians who are aware 
of the differences between Sunnis and Alevis. They are quick to use the Alevis as an example 
of Turks who 'successfully integrate' (Mandel 1990, p. 156). During an Alevi 'cultural night' 
organized by the AAKM in 1996, Hans Nisblé (the social-democrat mayor of the district of 
Wedding), attempted to position Aleviness as a political counterweight against Islamic 
radicalism. He even called upon the German people to stand by the Alevis against the 
challenge of 'radical Islam from within' prevailing over Europe and Germany (Kaya 1998, pp. 
42-43). This representation is also found in the press. The quotidian Die Tageszeitung speaks 
about 'liberal Alevis' in opposition to the IFB, and defines them as 'non-dogmatic Muslims'
†††
. 
So Aleviness is exempt from the alarmist representations widespread about mainstream Islam. 
Alevis are remarkably absent from the official reports on the protection of the Constitution 
(Verfassungsschutzberichte), something which is far from being the case for Turkish 
Islamists. The favorable perception of Aleviness by the German media is directly related to 
the Western reading of contemporary Turkey, which sees the secularist and 'modern' regime 
being threatened by radical Islam (Kaya 1998, p. 43).  
Beyond a 'juridical' appearance, with clear-cut criteria defining a status, the 
differentiated treatment of denominations seems to be clearly related to the political stakes 
concerning the presence of Islam in Germany. The granting of an institutional status implies 
an implicit hierarchization of groups by official institutions. 
 
Toward a 'denominationalization' of Aleviness in Germany? 
In this particular case, the judicial arm of the German state has recognized religious 
currents as putatively bounded groups. The relational differences between religious currents 
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are hereby stylized into differences between objectified categorical identities and quasi-
corporate 'communities'. This recognition of 'communities' encourages the latent tendency to 
stereotype their commonalities, essentializes their seemingly homogeneous culture, and 
ascribes to them a unified collective will. The communities established through incorporation 
are co-opted into processes of political consultation, as well as integrated into the flow of 
state-controlled resources (see Baumann 1998). Moreover, this transformation of a religious 
current into a religious community by state institutions induces a self-transformation by 
Alevists themselves into a kind of 'denomination' on the Christian model.  
What should be noted here is that before the recognition of the IFB, the AAKM 
claimed Aleviness should be taught, but in a non-denominational manner: it demanded the 
inclusion of Aleviness in a course that would be non-denominational, general religious 
education (religiöse Unterweisung), since 'only this system would encourage tolerance and 
mutual comprehension'
‡‡‡
. The position of the AABF was the same (AABF 2002, 9). But as 
soon as the right to teach was given to a Sunni organization--albeit partial and contested--, the 
AAKM applied for the establishment of a separate, competitive, denominational course as 
well. If Islamic instruction is introduced, they argue, the interest of Alevis too must be taken 
in account. Thus, they moved from a generalist and 'supra-denominational' stance to a 
particularistic and denominational one.  
The recognition of the AAKM also leads indirectly to the transformation of Aleviness 
in Berlin into a denomination, or a kind of 'Church'. One sign of this tendency is the process 
of renaming the AABF. Instead of 'Federation' – a term remaining from the time of big 
political organizations and trade-unions at the national level – the AABF considers the 
possibility to adopt the term 'Community of Alevis in Germany' (Gemeinde der Aleviten in 
Deutschland), the term Gemeinde being much more associated with religion. In order to be 
recognized as a religious community in other Länder, and as a civil law corporation, the 
AABF also has to prove the existence of a clearly identifiable organizational structure; thus, it 
initiated a modification of its statutes and its internal organization. In order to obtain this 
status, the AABF has to furnish proof of a binding religious authority. Therefore, it is in the 
course of redefining the role of the dede
§§§
.  
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It also has to furnish proof of a consensus on dogma and belief, a quite difficult task 
concerning Alevis. In the past, the teachings were handed down orally within different holy 
lineages and in special ceremonies. Due to the often divergent oral traditions held by the holy 
lineages, it would be exaggerated to speak of a single and coherent Alevi system of beliefs. 
Yet, this is exactly what is required today. Thus, the AABF founded in 1999 a 'Commission 
for Religious Instruction', which pursues the aim of developing a 'teachable' religion so as to 
meet the legal requirements. In order to succeed in the negotiations over religious instruction, 
this commission initiated the writing of a syllabus (AABF 2002). The production of a basic 
textbook breaks new ground, since it represents the first organized effort to write down, 
systematize and unify the dogma and beliefs and institutionalize learning in Aleviness
 ****
. In 
the syllabus, specific features differentiating Aleviness from orthodox Islam are stressed, and 
Aleviness is presented as a coherent system of belief on the model of Christianity. For 
example, although traditionally there weren't really any Alevi specialized religious buildings 
in which cem, the main religious ceremony, was celebrated
††††
, the syllabus presents cemevi 
(cem house) as 'the' worship place of Alevis, like the church or the mosque (AABF 2002, p. 
32-33)
‡‡‡‡
. 
Therefore, legal recognition has sociological consequences on the internal 
organization and political balances of Alevist organizations in Germany. As the requirements 
for recognition are basically derived from Christian traditions in Germany, adjustment to them 
will undoubtedly cause further transformations. Should we, thus, speak about a sociological 
transformation of Aleviness in Germany towards a denomination? In the public sphere, there 
is a general tendency towards the reconstruction of Aleviness as an Islamic denomination. 
However, since these external discourses concern mainly activists and organizations' leaders, 
they must not directly influence the representations of members or of Alevis, for which this 
whole debate may well be of little significance. It is still too early to evaluate the results of the 
teachings of Aleviness in public schools – which began in Fall 2002 in a very limited scope - 
and of the internal reorganization of the associations. In the meantime, one may assume that 
this shift of 'Alevism' will not directly lead to a transformation of 'Aleviness'.  
                                                 
13 There have been other attempts, mostly in Turkey. These, however, were not successful, due to the 
numerous divergences and the lack of opportunity to institutionalize this effort.  
14 In ordinary villages, the ceremony simply takes place in a large room of a family house. Specialized 
religious buildings exist only in centers of pilgrimage and, since the 1990s, in Alevist organizations. Recently, 
some are also being constructed in Alevi villages. 
15 Meeting the religious requirements was in fact quite difficult, since the syllabus has been set back 
many times by the authorities because of its lack of a professional character.  
Anyhow, these developments are quite remarkable because, as has been argued above, 
Alevists in Germany had until then expressed their specificity mostly in political or in cultural 
terms. In Germany, there is a stronger tendency than in Turkey to situate and reconstruct 
Aleviness outside Islam and to underestimate its religious dimension. Most Alevi 
organizations in Germany, including the majority of those affiliated with the AABF, had a 
generally secular attitude and remained largely indifferent towards religious questions. The 
predominant view was that Aleviness is a culture based on democracy and humanism. In fact, 
the great majority of Alevi associations in Germany carry in their name the word 'culture' 
(Sökefeld 2000, pp. 5-6) which is understood as being in opposition to religion, itself 
associated with backwardness. Since their creation, only a few Alevist organizations in 
Germany have shown a clear religious orientation, and most of them are not affiliated with the 
AABF. Unlike in Turkey, where some associations organize weekly cem, Aleviness was 
hardly reconstructed as a religion in Germany until now. Today, however, more and more 
organizations, first of all those affiliated with the AABF, stress a religious dimension, adopt 
more religious names, and consider themselves as worship places. As a consequence, two 
cemevi have recently been built in Germany. 
Could these recent developments towards a religious conception of Aleviness be a 
consequence of sociological developments? The fact that the first migrant generation is now 
retired and may feel more religious needs may well be a factor. Did the pensioners 
marginalize the most influential generation in the organizations, that of Alevist leaders who 
are mainly - more often than in Turkey – secular, former leftists, often political refugees of 
the 1970s and 1980s? This is not likely. In fact, those who are leading this 'religious turn' are 
not the first generation of now elderly Gastarbeiter, but the former leftists, who have today 
tempered their former secularism, or even atheism.  
On the whole, this increased emphasis on religion is not so much due to a regained 
strength of religiosity. It appears rather as a strategic response to changed public discourses 
and an adjustment to prevailing legal conditions, institutional opportunities and political 
discourse. This new framing seems to be strategic, deliberate, and goal oriented, since it is 
developed to achieve a specific purpose. Alevists make strategic efforts to link their 
interpretive frames with those of actual or prospective resource providers (Benford 2000, p. 
624). A significant indication for this 'strategic' interpretation is that the organization being 
granted a religious status is not nearly the most religious one; rather it is the biggest and the 
most orientated towards German institutions and public sphere. Another argument supporting 
this interpretation is that Alevists in France – who are 'sociologically' similar to those in 
Germany, secular, mainly former left-wing militants – have not adopted this religious tone. 
France adheres strictly to the principle of laicité, which implies a clear-cut separation of 
religion and State, and severely limits the possibilities for the recognition of religious groups 
and identities. In France, a more 'secularist' and 'humanist' framing, stressing, for example, the 
high value given by the Alevis to human rights, yields results, and is politically and 
strategically more pertinent (FUAF 2000).  
 
Unification through recognition? 
Another crucial development is that this opportunity has led, to some extent, to the 
setting aside of internal debates on Aleviness. Most - even non religious-minded - Alevis 
seem to support the demand for religious instruction. While the view that religion should be 
kept out of school is met with great approval, it is stressed that if Sunnis are granted the right 
to religious instruction, the Alevis should strive for it as well. Therefore, the fact that 
Aleviness is recognized and taught seems to be more important than the way it is (Kehl-
Bodrogi 2001). Thus, the desire for recognition of Alevi identity and the equality of rights 
with regard to Sunni Islam appears more important than the way Aleviness is defined. For the 
AABF, one of the main tasks of the syllabus is not only the transmission of knowledge on 
Alevi belief and culture (and of one interpretation of these), but 'identity building', i.e. the 
reinforcing of Alevi identity (AABF 2002, 10). The paradox is that the religious dimension 
may not be as important for Alevis as is the recognition of a status. 
This is also the case on an organizational level. For the first time, the struggle for 
recognition has managed to bring together competing Alevist organizations in Germany 
despite their strong ideological, political and personal divergences. The AABF, the Federation 
of the Alevis of Kurdistan (FEK), close to the PKK, and the German branch of the Turkish 
CEM foundation, joined to support a separate course in Aleviness, and created a Committee 
of Education of Alevi Organizations
§§§§
 to represent the only binding authority on educational 
matters. This joint struggle even led to the setting aside of internal debates on Aleviness in 
order to reach an agreement on the outward representation of Aleviness as a branch of Islam, 
a difficult task considering the profound divergences. As a consequence, the opening of a 
religious opportunity led to a kind of strategic consensus among Alevists in Germany on the 
outward framing of Aleviness as a branch of Islam for purposes of recognition and resources, 
and to the undermining of internal debate and dissension.  
 
3. Local national and elsewhere: multiple policy levels and 'transnationality' 
A last question remains to be answered: the recognition of the AAKM as a religious 
community occurred at a local level, because of the exclusive competence of the federate 
states in educational issues. However, the religious shift of Aleviness concerns Germany as a 
whole. Why? Do these developments have consequences on the situation in Turkey, or are 
these political spaces relatively impervious to each other? Whereas some actors try to 
generalize, nationalize or even transnationalize these developments, others attempt to 
dissociate them. Here, we have to disentangle the multilevel institutional environment, as well 
as the different levels of claim- and of policy-making.  
 
Multiple levels of policy-making 
First of all, one should not overestimate the coherence of institutions in a given 
political space. The recognition of the IFB, and then of the AAKM, was undertaken by the 
judiciary, in accordance with the mainly juridical treatment of issues concerning migration 
and the religion of migrants in Germany (Amiraux 2001). However, other German institutions 
criticized this decision very strongly, in principle or because of the assumed relations of the 
IFB with Milli Görüş. The Berlin school administration feared that the introduction of a 
separate Islamic teaching would hinder tolerance among pupils from different religious 
backgrounds. Many German politicians from all parties criticized this very controversial 
decision, as did most German-Turkish politicians. Even many Turkish migrants' organizations 
in Berlin contested the decision, claiming they did not feel represented by the IFB. Thus, the 
organs of jurisdiction can be considered to be relatively independent from political instances, 
which mostly opposed this decision.  
In the same way, the federate state employs processes of registration and functional 
devolution in order to carry out civic tasks, like religious teaching in public schools. In this 
perspective, the state of Berlin has a crucial place in Germany. Berlin was a pioneer for 
multicultural policies in the 1980s (Vertovec 1996). To achieve a ‘cosmopolitan, tolerant and 
                                                                                                                                                        
16 AKEK, Alevi Kuruluşları Eğitim Kurulu. See H. Özkan, "Alevi Inancı Eğitim Üst Kurulu", Özgür 
Politika, 18th November 2000. 
liberal Berlin', in which permanent foreign residents are successfully integrated, constituted 
one of the main objectives of the 1991 policy guidelines of the Berlin government (Çağlar 
1998, p. 251). As the capital of the new, unified Germany, Berlin has an even more symbolic 
role in the management of diversity. Given the difficult history of Germany regarding its 
immigrant populations, this task of making sure that ‘Berlin offers images reflecting advanced 
modes of managing cultural diversity’ (Vertovec 1996, p. 382) is critical for the local and 
national government. While the centralized legislative and executive organs of the German 
nation-state strive to maintain a 'neutral' civic equality, the organs of jurisdiction, and local 
government don't. The multiplicity and contradictions between different state institutions, as 
well as the relative autonomy of the judiciary and of the federate state, therefore offer 
opportunities for migrants' claims. 
 
'Nationalizing' recognition 
Profiting from these local dynamics, the AABF tried to generalize this recognition to a 
national German level. A few weeks after the recognition of the AAKM, the AABF started a 
campaign to apply for recognition as a religions community in all states where Alevis are 
settled. On behalf of affiliated organizations, the AABF made similar applications to four 
other states. Consequently, these four states, considering that this issue is not local, but 
national, decided to give a common answer to this request – something which has not yet been 
done. The interesting point here is that the issue of recognition, local at the beginning, is being 
nationalized both by activists and institutions.  
 
'Transnationalizing' recognition and the EU level 
A further policy- and claims-making level must been added to these local and national 
developments: the EU level, this time concerning Alevis in Turkey. In December 1999, at the 
Helsinki summit, Turkey was recognized as a candidate to the EU. The conditions Turkey 
must fulfill in order to begin negotiations for membership are the Copenhagen criteria, 
including the protection of minorities. In November 2000, the first Regular Report from the 
Commission on Turkey's Progress towards Accession stated that:  
the official approach towards the Alevis seems to remain unchanged. Alevi complaints 
notably concern compulsory religious instruction in schools and school books, which 
would not reflect the Alevi identity, as well as the fact that financial support is only 
available for the building of Sunni mosques and religious foundations. These issues 
are highly sensitive; however, it should be possible to have an open debate on them. 
(European Commission 2000, p. 18).  
This statement is reiterated almost in the same words in later reports. The interesting point is 
that it is situated in the section concerning freedom of religion, itself included in the chapter 
on 'civic and political rights', and not in the chapter on 'rights and protection of minorities', 
concerning mainly Gypsies and Kurds. Thus, the European Commission has implicitly 
recognized Aleviness as a religious phenomenon, and legitimized Alevis' demands. Thus, the 
Alevi issue has been inscribed in Turkey's European agenda among the points of necessary 
improvement for EU accession.  
In 2000, Aleviness was both recognized as a religious community in Berlin and 
inscribed in Turkey's European agenda, albeit in a disconnected manner. Since then, Alevists 
in Germany and Turkey have attempted to take advantage of these developments to obtain 
recognition in Turkey itself, putting transnational linkages into practice
*****
.  
 
The limits of transnationalization and the reactions 'at home' 
However, until now, these attempts have not been successful. Unlike in Germany, 
Alevists in Turkey did not clearly reframe Aleviness more religiously. Since religious 
recognition, as argued above, is probably the most difficult to achieve in Turkey, this has 
hindered the 'exporting' of recognition. As a matter of fact, the recognition of Aleviness in 
Berlin may well have hardened the attitude of the Turkish authorities and of many political 
actors against Alevism, making its claims even more illegitimate in their eyes.  
Turkish media and authorities reacted quite negatively to the recognition of the 
AAKM as a religious community in Berlin
†††††
, as it is often considered as dangerous to the 
Turkish nation and its unity. The recognition of both the IFB and AAKM were strongly 
criticized, since it excluded the sending state from the managing of the very sensitive issue of 
religion in migration, an issue it had been trying to maintain control of, for example through 
the foreign branch of the DİB, the DİTİB. Through this decision, the Turkish authorities are 
no longer the exclusive or privileged partners of German institutions in religious matters 
                                                 
17 "AABF başkanı Öker: Berlin örnek olacak", Milliyet, European edition, 7th July 2000. 
18 See for example R. Aksu, "Berlin'de Alevilik Dersi", Milliyet, 7th July 2000, p. 22 ; "Almanya'da 
'Alevilik Dersleri' oyunu", Hürriyet, 14th February 2001. 
concerning Turkish migrants. Moreover, institutions felt threatened by the acquisition abroad 
of a right they had always refused to grant. 
This negative reaction was accentuated by an incident in June 2000, itself related to 
the inclusion of the Alevi issue on Turkey's European agenda by the Commission. In the 
course of the preparation of the report, Alevist organizations presented their claims to 
European Union officials. They formulated their usual demands
‡‡‡‡‡
, but for the first time on a 
European arena. The Turkish ministry of foreign affairs found itself in an awkward position, 
because it had not been informed about this meeting. Thereafter, most Turkish media 
denounced the EU for introducing itself into Turkey's internal matters, and the Alevists for 
negotiating with the EU against Turkey and its national interest
§§§§§
. The Alevi issue being 
placed on Turkey's European agenda, without the Turkish government's awareness and 
approval, Turkish institutions were again bypassed.  
A few months later, the most influential Turkish daily, Hürriyet, began a virulently 
nationalist press campaign against the AABF, far beyond the normal coverage of Alevist 
activities in Europe (Sökefeld 2001)
******
. Giving coverage to the general assembly of the 
federation, the daily accused the AABF of irregular financial practices, before criticizing its 
general political stand. Among others, it accused the AABF of being influenced by the 
German government or even of working for it, of alienating the 'Alevi community' from the 
Turkish nation, and of transforming it into a tool of German interests against Turkey; in short, 
it suspected the AABF of separatism, of defending the Armenian genocide thesis, and of 
supporting Kurdish 'separatism'. Further, AABF's request of the right to give courses of 
Aleviness in German was interpreted as an attempt to compete with the mother tongue 
religious courses given by Turkish consulates in Germany, and thus to 'acculturate' Alevis 
instead of defending the transmission of Turkish culture
††††††
. Hürriyet reminded the AABF 
that, as a Turkish organization in Germany, it was responsible for defending Turkey's national 
interests, for example, concerning its accession to the EU. Obviously, the aim of this 
campaign was to weaken the AABF, perceived by Hürriyet as being a danger to Turkish 
national interest. It is not the first time that Hürriyet was acting as the defender of 
uncompromising Turkish nationalism in Europe. Hürriyet distributes more than 100,000 
                                                 
19 The suppression of compulsory religious instruction at school and of the DİB, the stopping of State 
construction of mosques in Alevi villages and more generally of assimilation attempts, the suppression of 
religious inscription on identity cards ; and an end to the partiality of State media. 
20 See for example M. Demir, "Gizli Alevi toplantısı", Hürriyet, .23rd June 2000 or B. Miser, 
"Aleviler'den AB'ye şikâyet", Milliyet, 23rd June 2000. 
21 From the end of November 2000 to February 2001, and again from mid-May to the end of June 2001. 
copies daily in Germany and thus clearly dominates the German-Turkish media (Zentrum für 
Türkei-Studien 1997). Here it must be noted that this campaign, albeit driven from Turkey, 
was released in the European edition of the daily, which is different from the Turkish one, and 
was not covered at all in the Turkish public sphere - nor in the German one. This campaign 
led to the end of the 'historical' unity of Alevists in Europe. For the AABF, cooperating with 
the FEK was thinkable in Germany for a limited and well-defined aim. But it became 
unthinkable as soon as it was portrayed as treachery to the Nation. 
A last development may well be related to the aforementioned ones. At the beginning 
of 2002, two proceedings were initiated against the Cultural Association of the Union of 
Alevi-Bektashi organizations (ABKB), the biggest federation of Alevist organizations both in 
Turkey and among the migrants. The presence of the words 'alevi', 'cem' and 'cemevi' in its 
statute was claimed to constitute separatism. Thus, the religious distinctness claimed by the 
Alevists was criminalized. Finally, the ABKB was closed down in February 2002 by a 
judiciary decision of Ankara's Security Directorate. In April 2002, another Alevist federation 
was created, the European Confederation of Alevi Communities (AABK), but it includes only 
organizations in Europe, and no Turkish ones. 
As activists try to transnationalize recognition, there is a parallel 'de-legitimization' 
and 'criminalization' of Alevism, and of what has been interpreted as its support from abroad, 
by Turkish institutions and nationalist actors. Are all these episodes related? It would be 
difficult to find a definite answer to this question. However, it is certain that up until now, 
Alevists have not been able to export the recognition they obtained in Berlin and from the 
European Commission to other political spaces, and notably to Turkey.  
 
Conclusion 
Within Alevist discourses, Aleviness is presented as an unity undivided by state 
boundaries. Alevist politics of identity among the migrants is clearly inscribed into a 
transnational political field, and always related to developments in Turkey.  
The relatively independent trajectories of one and the same movement in different 
political spaces show how much institutions define the pertinent categories and regulate the 
access to recognition and resources. Alevist claims are situated differently, institutionally and 
discursively, in local, national and supranational spaces. Political opportunity structures, 
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institutional frameworks, as well as contextual balances of power strongly influence the 
possibilities of action, and thus ways in which activists frame their claims. Therefore, these 
contexts lead to divergent strategies by the movements. Moreover, the very recognition of the 
organization in Berlin implied its adaptation to the environment in terms of framing and legal 
requirements, and thus its disjunction from the movement at home and elsewhere.  
But these different state practices, legal frames and supranational institutions are 
related and intertwined in situating Aleviness. Thus, it is a multilevel and entangled process. 
Some actors – activists, but also state institutions – try to generalize, nationalize or even 
transnationalize claims and recognitions; but they come up against the obstacle of different 
existing conditions elsewhere, and against other actors – here again state institutions, media as 
well as activists - attempting to limit these generalizing efforts. In this particular case, 
'restricting' attempts have until now had the upper hand.  
Why is this the case? Is the Alevist movement in Germany, which is not sponsored 
from Turkey and therefore quite autonomous, more adaptable to new contexts than other, 
more structured movements? Does the extremely divided and fluid character of the Alevist 
movement explain why in every context, a different branch attempts to take advantage of the 
existing opportunities? Divergent trajectories of Alevism indicate that the continuity between 
mobilizations at home and abroad - and thus the 'transnational' dimension - is often 
overestimated, by abstracting movements from their concrete contexts and the constraints 
they involve. The theoretical challenge remains to analyze these multilevel processes, 
complex actors and entangled spaces. 
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